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Abstract
Background: In the wake of various high-profile incidents in a number of countries, regulators of healthcare quality
have been criticised for their ‘soft’ approach. In politics, concerns were expressed about public confidence. It was
claimed that there are discrepancies between public opinions related to values and the values guiding regulation
policies. Although the general public are final clients of regulators’ work, their opinion has only been discussed in
research to a limited extent.
The aim of this study is to explore possible discrepancies between public values and opinions and current healthcare
quality regulation policies.
Methods: A questionnaire was submitted to 1500 members of the Dutch Healthcare Consumer Panel. Questions were
developed around central ideas underlying healthcare quality regulation policies.
Results: The response rate was 58.3 %. The regulator was seen as being more responsible for quality of care than care
providers. Patients were rated as having the least responsibility. Similar patterns were observed for the food service
industry and the education sector. Complaints by patients’ associations were seen as an important source of
information for quality regulation, while fewer respondents trusted information delivered by care providers.
However, respondents supported the regulator’s imposition of lighter measures firstly.
Conclusions: There are discrepancies and similarities between public opinion and regulation policies. The discrepancies
correspond to fundamental concepts; decentralisation of responsibilities is not what the public wants. There is little
confidence in the regulator’s use of information obtained by care providers’ internal monitoring, while a larger role is
seen for complaints of patient organisations. This discrepancy seems not to exist regarding the regulator’s approach of
imposing measures. A gradual, and often soft approach, is favoured by the majority of the public in spite of the criticism
that is voiced in the media regarding this approach. Our study contributes to the limited knowledge of public opinion
on government regulation policies. This knowledge is needed in order to effectively assess different approaches to
involve the public in regulation policies.
Background
In the wake of various high-profile incidents such as
the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust scandal
in the United Kingdom, several countries including the
Netherlands have faced comparable organisational cri-
ses and problems with achieving political goals such as
public confidence in healthcare, legitimacy and account-
ability of regulators in healthcare [1–7]. The criticisms
expressed in the media, by politicians and by patient orga-
nisations are often directed at the regulators’ cooperating
approach in cases where healthcare providers fail to com-
ply with quality standards. Furthermore, it is claimed that
regulators fail to respond to patients’ complaints [4, 7].
Although it is often recommended to involve the pub-
lic as they are the final clients of the regulator’s services
[8, 9], their opinions on regulatory policies have only
been discussed in research to a limited extent. The main
research question in this study is therefore whether
there are discrepancies between the values and opinions
of the public and the current values of policies and strat-
egies for regulation of healthcare quality, and if so, what
are these discrepancies? The Dutch situation is used as a
case study.
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The next paragraph addresses important theoretical
concepts underlying regulation, followed by a descrip-
tion of healthcare quality regulation policies and related
issues in the Netherlands. We then explain the methods
used in this study, followed by the results and
discussion.
Responsive regulation
Internationally, regulation in various industries such as
healthcare, finance and environmental businesses is
based on the theory of ‘responsive regulation’ of Ayres
and Braithwaite (1992) [10, 11]. The basic idea is that
the parties being regulated are considered to be trust-
worthy and intrinsically motivated by social responsibil-
ity. According to this theory, strategies of regulation
should be flexible, in synergy with the context of those
being regulated, and based on dialogue. Regulation based
on trust will improve quality of care more effectively,
while regulation based on distrust arguably only leads to
more sanctions and therefore more capacity on the part
of the regulator and ultimately to higher costs to society
[10]. Single regulatory strategies are seldom effective.
Weaknesses of one strategy can be complemented by
strengths of another. A wide array of strategies such as
monitoring performance indicators and targets, incident
reporting systems, and more stricter measures as crim-
inal penalties should together contribute to the effective-
ness of regulation [10, 12]. Regulatory compliance is
encouraged by using cooperation, persuasion, inspection
and enforcement notices in the first instance, and
secondarily by applying heavier measures in the case of
riskier behaviour. This vision is often described as ‘high
trust, high penalty’ [10]. This strategy corresponds to the
international trend of government functions changing
from the old “commanding and controlling” to “steering
not rowing”, whereby responsibilities are shifted from
the government to the field and new governing mecha-
nisms are introduced such as marketisation of public
sectors [4, 13–17]. Another important component of the
theory is ‘tripartism’, which is proposed as a mechan-
ism for empowering public interest groups and de-
creasing the risk of regulatory capture. Furthermore,
tripartism can prevent conflicts of values between the
different stakeholders. In tripartism, a public interest
group participates as a third group in the regulatory
process: it is given power by being granted access to all
the information that is available to the regulator, and
by being offered a seat at the negotiation table for en-
forcement and compliance [3, 10, 18–21]. In many
countries, involvement of the public in regulation is on
the policy agenda and different approaches are being
considered, such as using the experiences of the public
at large [5, 12, 22–24]. However, research has shown
that public interest in regulatory agencies is limited, as
is the public visibility of these agencies [25–27]. Low
public interest may not be a great problem, as these
agencies interact primarily with the industry rather
than with the general public. However, regulators often
do tend to become visible to the public in times of
crisis [27, 28]. Scandals and incidents and the accom-
panying media attention can have a direct influence on
the regulators’ reputation [28–30], and may possibly
jeopardise public confidence in the industry and its
regulation [4, 7, 31]. Although regulation is often de-
fined as “sustained and focused control exercised by a
public agency over activities that are valued by a commu-
nity” [32, 33], research shows that in risk cases involving
for instance genetically modified food or radioactive waste,
the public does not regard the government regulator as
having the same values as themselves [34]. This also
implies that it is important for ensuring the legitimacy,
public accountability and transparency of a regulator and
for involving the public in regulation policies that the
values of regulatory policies are consistent with the values
of communities. Differences between the values and opin-
ions of the public and the current values of policies and
strategies for regulation and underlying ideas of the theory
of ‘responsive regulation’, are the main focus of this article.
Dutch healthcare quality regulation policies
In the Netherlands, the healthcare system was reformed
into a regulated market system in 2006 [35]. Before the
introduction of this reform, two types of healthcare
quality regulation could be distinguished: state regula-
tion and professional self-regulation. Since the competi-
tion mechanisms were introduced, the market was
supposed to be a new complementary governing mech-
anism and the state’s function followed a more decentra-
lised approach [17, 35, 36]. In this system, the focus on
patient choice and transparency of quality of care has
increased [13, 15–17]. Since the introduction of the
Quality Act (1996), care providers have been given more
responsibilities and are supposed to develop quality stan-
dards. The Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate monitors per-
formance against these standards (more information
about monitoring and enforcement strategies in Table 1).
However, the Netherlands has also seen several high-
profile incidents in healthcare that led to concerns in so-
ciety and a heated political debate about the Inspectorate
[18, 36–39]. It was argued that the Inspectorate failed to
respond to emerging signals including patients’ com-
plaints and it should have enforced the rules more
strictly, because its actions had been too hesitant and
trusting of care providers who were not complying with
quality standards. Members of the Dutch House of Rep-
resentatives spoke of “the debate representing the gap
between the public and politics, but in miniature”. It was
stated that the public and their complaints deserve more
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attention and should be involved in regulation policies
[40]. In the Netherlands, those problems regulators ex-
perience are not unique to the healthcare sector. State
regulators in the food service industry and education
sector face similar incidents and reputational losses [41].
Therefore, this article aims to provide a broader picture
of public values and opinions about state agencies and
their role in risk regulation.
Methods
Questionnaire
We developed questions reflecting the concepts of the
theory of ‘responsive regulation’, ‘high trust, high pen-
alty’, and ‘tripartism’.
Firstly, in order to explore public opinion about the
concept of ‘responsive regulation’ and the role and pos-
ition of the state regulator with respect to the regulated
parties and other stakeholders, we developed questions
about the responsibilities of professionals, the government
and other quality-of-care stakeholders. We included
equivalent questions concerning quality regulation in the
food service industry and in education, in order to assess
whether public opinion is unique to the health sector
or if it represents more common attitudes regarding re-
sponsibility. The Dutch Inspectorate of Education is
part of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science.
The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety
Authority is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
They also base their regulation policies on the theory of
‘responsive regulation’ [42, 43].
In each sector, seven stakeholders were represented:
the state regulators (Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate,
Dutch Inspectorate of Education, Netherlands Food and
Consumer Product Safety Authority); users (patients,
students and their parents, and consumers); executive
roles (care providers, teachers, and personnel who pre-
pare food); direct colleagues of the executive roles in the
three sectors; managers in the three sectors; ministers
(Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports, Minister of
Education, Culture and Science, Minister of Economic
Affairs); and the European Union. For each stakeholder,
respondents were asked to select an answer on a five-
point scale, where one meant no responsibility and five
meant full responsibility.
The other questions focused mainly on regulation of
quality of healthcare by the Dutch Healthcare Inspector-
ate. The concept of ‘tripartism’ was explored by enquir-
ing about the patients’ responsibility for quality of care
and the role patient information should have in monitor-
ing healthcare quality. The questions also included exist-
ing information sources used by the Inspectorate, such
as complaints from members of the public, complaints
from care providers, and quality information supplied by
the care providers themselves. In addition, sources for
collecting information that are currently not used by the
Inspectorate were included, such as searching the Inter-
net for complaints.
Furthermore, the concept ‘high trust, high penalty’ was
operationalised into questions focusing on what respon-
dents considered to be good methods for regulating the
quality of care. Respondents were asked what sanctions
the Inspectorate should impose when care providers fail
to provide adequate quality of care. Possible sanctions
ranged from soft measures such as ‘double-checking the
care institution’ to stricter measures such as ‘closing the
care institution’. Possible answers were ‘totally disagree’,
‘disagree’, ‘neither disagree nor agree’, ‘agree’ and ‘totally
agree’. The questionnaire was assessed by a permanent
committee with delegates from several stakeholder organi-
sations in healthcare such as of the Ministry of Health,
Welfare and Sports, the Healthcare Insurers Board, and
the Federation of Patients and Consumer Organisations.
Their feedback was used to finalize the questionnaire.
Panel
The questionnaire was submitted in February 2013 to a
sample of 1500 members of the Dutch Healthcare Con-
sumer Panel. The Dutch Healthcare Consumer Panel at
that time consisted of approximately 6000 people aged 18
and older. A sample of 1500 persons that is representative
Table 1 Regulation and enforcement instruments of the Dutch
Healthcare Inspectorate
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate is the body
appointed by the government to supervise and regulate quality of
healthcare. It is an independent part of the Ministry of Health, Welfare
and Sports. The Inspectorate pays regular visits, which become more
frequent if care providers do not comply with quality standards. Both
care providers and the public can report incidents or lodge complaints.
However, the Inspectorate’s statutory tasks mean that it cannot handle
complaints by individual patients unless the complaints are structural or
very severe
Information about the quality of care is collected and analysed to signal
potential risks. Information sources include the following:
- System based supervision (monitoring of internal quality systems
and governance arrangements)
- Performance indicators
- Reporting of incidents (by the public or care providers)
- Detection of prosecutable facts
- Thematic supervision
The Inspectorate is authorised to use the following regulation and
enforcement instruments:
- Advice and incentives (consultation, campaigns);
- Corrective measures (impose improvement plans, strengthened
monitoring);
- Administrative measures (command, advice to the Minister to
issue a direction, penal sum, administrative fine);
-Measures under criminal or disciplinary law.
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of the Dutch population was drawn from the Healthcare
Consumer Panel. The composition of the sample was
compared with the general population in the Netherlands
based on data from Statistics Netherlands [44], in order to
make it reflect the composition of the Dutch population.
Membership of the panel lasts for a maximum of 5 years.
Members can quit at any time. New panel members are
sampled from the general population and selected on
basic characteristics needed to keep the panel represen-
tative for the Dutch population. This renewal also en-
sures that members do not develop specific knowledge
of healthcare issues and that questionnaire fatigue does
not occur. Questionnaires can be received by post or
through the Internet, based on the preference of the
member. To increase the response rate, two electronic
reminders and one postal reminder were sent to mem-
bers who had not responded yet. The Dutch Healthcare
Consumer Panel is registered with the Dutch Data Pro-
tection Authority (no. 1262949) [45].
Ethics statement
Our study complied with the Helsinki Declaration where
applicable. According to the Dutch ‘Medical Research
involving human subjects Act’, neither obtaining in-
formed consent nor formal ethical approval for this
study was required [46]. No medical interventions were
involved and the impact of the questionnaires on daily
life was considered minor and thus the welfare and
rights of the panel members were protected. Panel mem-
bers were free to answer the questions or not.
Statistical analyses
In order to obtain a ranking of responsibility of the
seven stakeholders in the three sectors, mean scores for
responsibility were calculated. For each sector (health-
care, education and food service) respondents could
rate responsibility on a five-point scale for each of the
seven stakeholders. Differences between responsibility
scores of groups of stakeholders were analysed by creat-
ing pair-wise comparisons using the Wilcoxon signed
rank test [47].
For the other questions, about information sources
and methods of regulation, the first two and last two
answer categories were combined. Those results are pre-
sented descriptively.
Background characteristics of the study sample were
compared to the characteristics of the Dutch population.
Data on the Dutch population was obtained from Statis-
tics Netherlands. Research on consumer behaviour shows
that younger and more highly educated respondents have
more critical attitudes towards services [48]. Therefore,
differences in age categories, education levels and the ex-
tent to which respondents knew about the Inspectorate
were therefore tested by chi-squared tests. This was not
possible for ethnicity because almost all respondents were
from Dutch origin.
P-values of <0.05 were considered to be significant.
The data was analysed using the statistical software
program STATA version 12.1.
Results
In total, 875 respondents returned the questionnaire
(response rate: 58.3 %). Almost half of the respondents
were female (47.7 %). They ranged in age from 18 to 87,
with a mean of 51.4. More than half (57.6 %) of the
respondents had a medium level of education. The study
sample is ethnically less diverse than the overall Dutch
population. See Table 2 for the study sample characteris-
tics compared to the characteristics of the general Dutch
population. With the exception of educational level
and ethnicity, the sample is comparable to the Dutch
population.
The majority (76.3 %) of the respondents of the Dutch
Consumer Panel reported some degree of knowledge of
the Inspectorate’s work, and about one in ten respon-
dents indicated that they knew exactly what the Inspect-
orate does. The remaining 14.6 % admitted a lack of
knowledge. Additional analysis showed that respondents
who are currently working or previously worked in
healthcare (30.2 %) were significantly more likely to re-
port knowing, either to some extent or very precisely,
what the Inspectorate does.
Respondents rated the Inspectorate to bear most re-
sponsibility for the quality of healthcare, assigning it a
significantly higher score than care providers (Table 3).
Next in ranking came the care providers, the minister,
managers, colleagues of care providers, and finally the
European Union. Patients were rated to bear the least
responsible for quality of healthcare, and this result was
statistically significant. The same applies for students
and their parents in the educational setting and con-
sumers in the food service industry. The education
sector showed approximately the same order of respon-
sibility of stakeholders as healthcare, except for the posi-
tions of the managers and the minister being reversed.
Significant differences were found between the Dutch
Inspectorate of Education and teachers, but not between
teachers and managers. In the food service industry,
both the personnel who prepared food and the food
sector managers were rated as bearing slightly more
responsibility than the Netherlands Food and Con-
sumer Product Safety Authority. However, this was not
significant.
Respondents were asked what information sources the
Inspectorate could best rely on to monitor healthcare
quality (Fig. 1). The majority of respondents (93.2 %)
agreed (totally or partially) that the Inspectorate could
best rely on the complaints of patient associations. In
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addition, a large majority (87.1 %) agreed (totally or par-
tially) that the Inspectorate should visit all care pro-
viders. In addition, the respondents’ opinion was that
the Inspectorate should rely on sources such as com-
plaints of care providers (87.3 %) and members of the
public (85.3 %). Fewer respondents (approximately half )
agreed (totally or partially) that the Inspectorate should
rely on information provided by care institutions them-
selves, whereas 23 % were of the opinion (totally or
partially) that it should not.
Respondents were asked what measures the Inspector-
ate should take in cases of poor care (Fig. 2). If a
healthcare provider delivers poor care, the majority indi-
cated that the Inspectorate should double-check the care
institution (96.4 %) and provide recommendations for
improvements (93.9 %). In addition, about 70 % of re-
spondents agreed (totally or partially) that the Inspector-
ate should publish poor care delivery on its website. With
respect to other possible regulatory measures, allowances
should be made for the fact that between 20 and 48 % of
the respondents answered indifferently (‘neither disagree
nor agree’). Slightly more than half of the respondents
indicated that the Inspectorate should issue a fine when
poor care was provided. Furthermore, 53.3 % of the
Table 2 Background characteristics of study sample and Dutch populationa
Number Study sample % Dutch population (18 and older) 2013 %
Gender 875
Female 416 47.7 % 50.5 %
Male 458 52.3 % 49.5 %
Age 875
18–39 275 31.4 % 34.0 %
40–64 405 46.3 % 44.8 %
65 and older 195 22.3 % 21.2 %
Ethnicity 874
Dutch 840 96.1 % 78.9 %
Other 34 3.9 % 21.1 %
Education level 841
Low (none, primary school or prevocational education) 132 15.7 % 30.4 %b
Medium (secondary or vocational education) 484 57.6 % 40.3 %b
High (professional higher education or university) 225 26.8 % 28.3 %b
Work in healthcare 846 not available
No, I have never worked in healthcare 590 69.7 %
Yes, I am currently working in healthcare 122 14.4 %
Yes, I worked in healthcare in the past 134 15.8 %
aData about the Dutch population come from Statistics Netherlands
bThese percentages apply to the Dutch population aged 15–65 in 2012. The educational level of the remaining percentage is unknown
Table 3 Mean scores on responsibility (1 = no responsibility, 5 = full responsibility) of various stakeholders for quality in the Dutch
healthcare, education and food service industry (N = 819-838)a
Health care Education Food service
Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate | Dutch Inspectorate of Education | Netherlands Food and
Consumer Product Safety Authority
4.42a 4.52a 4.36a
Care providers | Teachers | Personnel who prepare food 4.29a 4.46 4.43
Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports | Minister of Education, Culture and Science | Minister of
Economic Affairs
4.17 4.23 3.74a
Managers 4.11a 4.38a 4.41
Direct colleagues of care providers | Direct colleagues of teachers | Direct colleagues of personnel
who prepare food
3.92a 4.20a 4.13a
European Union 3.41a 3.48a 3.32a
Patients | Students and their parents | Consumers 2.98 3.22 2.70
aSignificant score of responsibility compared to group of stakeholders with lower score. Intergroup comparisons were tested using the Wilcoxon signed rank test
[47]. P-values of <0.05 were considered significant
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respondents agreed (totally or partially) that the Inspector-
ate should temporarily take over the management of a
poorly performing care institution. Slightly more than a
quarter of all respondents indicated that the healthcare
institution should be closed if it provides poor care.
We analysed whether there were differences in the
answers given by different age groups, educational levels
and knowledge about the Inspectorate. Some significant
differences were found. Less highly educated and older re-
spondents tended to agree more often on some questions
Fig. 1 Evaluation of sources for monitoring healthcare quality by the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate according to respondents of the Dutch
Healthcare Consumer Panel (N = 818-838)
Fig. 2 What the Healthcare Inspectorate should do when a care institution delivers poor care according to respondents of the Dutch Healthcare
Consumer Panel (N = 818-832)
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that the Inspectorate should respond more actively than
suggested by respondents in the other categories.
For instance, respondents in the two older age groups
and those with a low or medium level of education
agreed more often that the Inspectorate should advise
patients in cases of poor care delivery to go to another
care institution and inform the media than respondents
from the other groups did (p = 0.000-0.001). Further-
more, less highly educated respondents agreed more
often that the Inspectorate should search the Internet
for complaints about care providers than respondents
from the other groups did (p = 0.02). In addition, less
highly educated respondents agreed more often that the
Healthcare Inspectorate should issue fines in cases of
poor care delivery than more highly educated respon-
dents (p = 0.03). Lastly, respondents who admitted a lack
of knowledge about the Inspectorate’s work, tended to
answer indifferently more often on some questions.
Discussion
This study aimed to explore the opinions and values of
the public regarding healthcare quality regulation pol-
icies, analysing the Dutch situation as a case study. Simi-
larly to other countries such as the UK, the Netherlands
had some high-profile incidents in which the regulator
failed to respond to various emerging signals, including
patients’ complaints. These led to concerns about public
confidence in healthcare and the regulator.
Internationally, political visions on governance and
regulation are changing from centralised to decentra-
lised approaches and responsibilities are being shifted
from the government to the field [4, 13–17]. In the
Netherlands, this changing vision resulted in the intro-
duction of the Quality Act in 1996, which made care
providers primarily responsible for the quality of care.
In this framework, regulation relies on internal moni-
toring and self-regulation, on the basis of which the
regulator monitors performance [17, 36]. This vision
fits with the theory of responsive regulation, in which
regulators entrust those being regulated to take their
responsibilities [10]. This study shows that the majority
of the public partly support this idea: the public
assigned a high degree of responsibility to care pro-
viders. However, a fundamental discrepancy became ap-
parent: the predominant rhetoric of decentralisation of
responsibilities was not supported and the majority of
the public seem to have little confidence in the internal
monitoring of quality by care providers and the use of
this information for regulation. Other studies also
found that a large proportion of the public assign re-
sponsibility for promoting safety and preventing med-
ical errors in healthcare to state agencies [31, 49].
Moreover, this study shows that there is a generalised
idea among the public that the state regulator has a
prominent role, as the same patterns were observed for
the food service industry and the education sector.
Apparently, according to the majority of the public, the
internal monitoring of quality and safety of healthcare
cannot simply be left to the goodwill of the care pro-
viders. Nevertheless, although some differing opinions
were found among older and less well-educated respon-
dents, the majority support the regulators’ gradual ap-
proaches of imposing measures to care providers who
fail to comply with quality standards, as proposed by
the theory of responsive regulation [10]. Thus, the ma-
jority prefer a greater responsibility and an active role
by the regulator with regard to gathering information
but not a stricter approach with regard to imposing
measures for the state regulator.
It has been stressed in several studies that more demo-
cratic approaches to regulation, such as ‘tripartism’, might
overcome the conflicts of values that are important to the
different stakeholders [3, 10, 18–21, 23]. On the one
hand, the majority of the public attach importance to
complaints of patient associations as a source of infor-
mation for regulation. This is an interesting finding, as
questions have been raised in several European coun-
tries about how patients’ complaints should be valued
and have a place in the regulatory process, and public
participation in regulation is an important item on the
policy agenda [2, 3, 5, 18, 24, 36, 37, 40]. The use of pa-
tients’ complaints can be seen as a reduced form of
tripartism whereby services become more responsive to
and learn from their users. Actually, The Mid Stafford-
shire Public Inquiry showed that inferences about
general patient safety can be gained from individual
complaints. Moreover, in this case, individual complaints
even indicated dramatic systemic failures [2]. A voice for
the patients provides information about ‘blind spots’ that
care providers are unaware of; this is also called ‘soft
intelligence’ [7]. In this respect, it should be investigated
what value complaints could have for regulation of health-
care quality and what those who report complaints to reg-
ulators themselves expect from their complaint in the
process of healthcare quality regulation. On the other
hand, patients were also considered to bear least responsi-
bility for quality of care by the public in this study. This
might undermine the goals of the reform of marketisation
in healthcare towards more ‘active patient choice’ and
more responsibility for patients. Furthermore, the role
of patient organisations and their expected role of par-
ticipating in decision-making processes might be at
stake [3, 12, 13, 22]. In addition, it might indicate that
the majority of the public do not favour intensive or
active methods of ‘tripartism’ in the regulatory process,
but instead support more collective forms of participa-
tion. This suggestion requires further research, which
should include the public’s and patient’s perspectives.
Bouwman et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:325 Page 7 of 9
Strengths and weaknesses
One strength of this study is its large study sample.
However, the response rate was moderate which may
have caused non-response bias. This sample is compar-
able to the Dutch population in terms of age and gender,
although not with respect to educational level. With
respect to the different background variables, we ana-
lysed differences in answers. Some significant differences
were found in the answers of older and less highly edu-
cated respondents. This means that different opinions of
subgroups among the public can exist. This should be
taken into account when involving the public in regula-
tion policies.
It is striking that a considerable proportion of the re-
spondents answered indifferently. This was also apparent
in other studies on public perceptions of the Inspector-
ate [25, 26]. The regulator might be a ‘low interest good’,
its visibility might be low, or respondents might have
too little knowledge to answer the questions. However,
less than 1 % answered indifferently on all items of Figs. 1
and 2, so this does not mean that the public have no opin-
ions or expectations about healthcare regulation. Further-
more, people might have or might gradually develop more
general or common-sense ideas about the Inspectorate
and its responsibilities, especially when it attracts media
attention. Lastly, it remains unsure whether the same
questions about healthcare, food service industry and edu-
cation sector have equal connotations to the respondents.
Therefore, the outcomes with respect to the comparison
of the three sectors should be interpreted cautiously.
Conclusion
Many countries face problems of public accountability,
legitimacy and transparency of regulators. To tackles
these issues, it is important that the values of regulatory
policies are consistent with the values of the public. This
study shows that there are discrepancies and similarities
between public opinion and regulatory policies. A grad-
ual, and often mild approach with regard to imposing
measures to failing care providers, is favoured by the
majority of the public in spite of the criticism that is
voiced in the media regarding this approach. However,
the majority of the public do not support decentralisa-
tion of responsibilities of the regulator. This applies not
only to healthcare, but also to other industries. Further-
more, the majority agree that the patients’ voice and
especially their complaints should play a pivotal role in
regulatory policies. Moreover, a form of collective par-
ticipation by the general public or patients in the regula-
tory process can potentially overcome the conflict in
values between the public and regulatory policies. It also
provides information about ‘blind spots’. It would be
worthwhile to explore which specific forms of involve-
ment of the public are most suitable while taking into
account differing opinions of subgroups, as this would
provide a valuable addition to the quality information
delivered by healthcare providers. Our study contributes
to the limited knowledge of public opinion on govern-
ment regulation policies. This knowledge is needed in
order to effectively assess different approaches to involve
the public in regulation policies.
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